Monday, June 1, 2015

America's Nightmare as The Fallen Angel

Many fear that the current deflation outbreak will turn into a “vicious circle of deflation,” in which consumption is postponed and investment plans are curtailed in anticipation of lower prices. These behaviors contribute to a further drop in demand and additional reductions in prices.

Deflation is misunderstood
The first part is correct "Consumption is postponed and investment plans curtailed" but is it

1) in anticipation of lower prices
2) in anticipation of job losses, not getting social security payment, not saving enough for retirement

there are very different explanations for consumer behavior here. 

One claims that future liabilities (expenses) will be lower if I wait, the other is based off expectations of future cash flow from my assets (in essence I've written down my social security assets and goodwill and must increase savings, lower expenses to meet future spending).
And is it really only fear itself  and something far fetched or is it something that happens all the time all over the world? 

Take what's being asked of the Greeks and their 'secure' retirement funds:
“Pensions should not be higher of 53% of the salary due to the financial situation of the social security funds.”

Pension for a civil servant (director, 37 years of work) should come down to €900 from €1,386 today after the pension cuts during the austerity years.

Pension for private sector – IKA insurer (37 years of work, 11,000 IKA stamps) and salary €2,300 should come down to €1,250 from €1,452 today after the austerity cuts. (examples* via here)
Of course, with the PSI in March 2012, Greece’s social security funds suffered a huge slap in their deposits in Greek bonds.

There's no confidence that the future will provide sufficient opportunities, there's no hope of a brighter tomorrow. The most powerful country the world has ever seen, slouched over on its mound of treasures, angry, divided and hopeless.

I agree with someone at the FED?

“If consumer behaviour is still being impacted by the experience of the financial crisis, the Great Recession, and the painfully slow recovery, then it is possible that the economy will not be as robust as many economic models would suggest, because the models do not take into account this behavioural change,” Eric Rosengren said.

How do you inspire confidence in the future? How does one unite a divided country and steer it towards a common productive goal? What has been the most effective way to redistribute wealth and lower inequality? What can bring back millions of manufacturing jobs in less than a year?

War...preferably between nations with great wealth that will purchase from the US, a repeat of WW2. perhaps SE Asia, Japan vs China? Maybe Saudi Arabia vs Iran? Maybe Europe vs Russia? the possibilities are endless.

The change in mindset (across the populace and as reflected in our congress, senate and white house) and wealth redistribution are the hardest tasks to accomplish and have a longer impact than the war itself.

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

The next bubble: snow tension cracks


Buybacks in US
“Buybacks have been a tremendous support for US equities,” says Orrin Sharp-Pierson, a strategist at BNP Paribas. Referencing the efforts of aggressive central bank policy, he adds: “It’s been like quantitative easing directly on equities, $40bn-$50bn per month.

Companies have been a key source of support in recent years as investors have stepped back from buying equities. Since the start of 2010, companies have spent $3.3tn on share buybacks and dividends, as the US economy has recovered and investors sought blue-chip names with stable and growing returns.

Over the past five years, US investors have poured $301.5bn into domestic equity exchange traded funds, data from XTF.com shows. However, with redemptions of $411.1bn from US stock mutual funds over the same period, there has been a shortfall of more than $100bn between the two, according to the Investment Company Institute.

Negative Bond Yields in Europe via QE
Negative bond yields cause the value of liabilities to balloon and the adverse impact on the pension fund’s solvency will tend to outweigh any benefit from QE on the value of the asset.

The risk is that cheap borrowing will finance suboptimal investments, whether in fixed assets or expensive share buybacks in a frothy equity market. At the same time the debtors’ paradise keeps zombie banks afloat and allows them to roll over the debts of zombie companies. That in turn holds back productivity growth.

US QE

China debt-fueled expansion

Monday, January 5, 2015

This ghost that runs after you, my brother, is more beautiful than you; why do you not give him your flesh and your bones?

"Higher yet than the love of human beings I esteem the love of things and ghosts. This ghost that runs after you, my brother, is more beautiful than you; why do you not give him your flesh and your bones? " - Nietzsche

This ghost that runs after me, 
My brother, has caught me

My flesh and bones, my daughter
You are beyond me, more beautiful
An evolution and a leap ahead

Still warm from the blaze of the eternal
Zlatica defying the Fates
Ascending from the realm of the impossible
From ghost to flesh



Hours from the greatest country on earth
The streets of my youth will forever be memories
I am banished and excommunicated in modern times
I have no political enemy, the city itself warns me
Plagued with faceless, warped and savage brothers
Never to hold my grandmother again
Or to introduce her to her grand-daughter

Thursday, October 9, 2014

O


Wednesday, October 8, 2014

Richmond Fed president Jeffrey Lacker "The Fed’s Mortgage Favoritism"

Modern central banks enjoy extraordinary independence, typically operating free from political interference. That has proved critical for price stability in recent decades, but it puts central banks in a perpetually precarious position. Central-bank legitimacy will wane without boundaries on tools used for credit-market intervention.
Since 2009 the Fed has acquired $1.7 trillion in mortgage-backed securities underwritten by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac , the mortgage companies now under government conservatorship. Housing finance was at the heart of the financial crisis, and these purchases began in early 2009 out of concern for the stability of the housing-finance system. Mortgage markets have since stabilized, but the purchases have resumed, with more than $800 billion accumulated since September 2012.
We were skeptical of the need for the purchase of mortgage assets, even in 2009, believing that the Fed could achieve its goals through the purchase of Treasury securities alone. Now, as the Fed looks to raise the federal-funds rate and other short-term interest rates to more normal levels, that normalization should include a plan to sell these assets at a predictable pace, so that we can minimize our distortion of credit markets. The Federal Open Market Committee’s recent statement of normalization principles did not include such a plan. For this reason, the first author, an FOMC participant, was unwilling to support the principles.
The Fed’s MBS holdings go well beyond what is required to conduct monetary policy, even with interest rates near zero. The Federal Reserve has two main policy mandates: price stability and maximum employment. In the past, the pursuit of higher employment has sometimes led the Fed (and other central banks) to sacrifice monetary stability for the short-term employment gains that easier policy can provide. This sacrifice can bring unfortunate consequences such as the double-digit inflation seen in the 1960s and 1970s.
But during the Great Moderation—the period of relatively favorable economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s—a consensus emerged that, over time, the central bank’s effect on employment and other real economic variables is limited. Instead, the central bank’s unique capability is to anchor the longer-term behavior of the price level. Governments came to see that entrusting monetary policy to an institution with substantial day-to-day independence could help overcome the inflationary bias that short-term electoral pressures can impart.
The independence of the central bank cannot be boundless, however. In a democracy, the central bank must be accountable for performance against its legislated macroeconomic goals. What is essential for operational independence is the central bank’s ability to manage the quantity of money it supplies—that is, the monetary liabilities on its balance sheet—because this is how modern central banks influence short-term interest rates.
A balance sheet has two sides, though, and it is the asset side that can be problematic. When the Fed buys Treasury securities, any interest-rate effects will flow evenly to all private borrowers, since all credit markets are ultimately linked to the risk-free yields on Treasurys. But when the central bank buys private assets, it can tilt the playing field toward some borrowers at the expense of others, affecting the allocation of credit.
If the Fed’s MBS holdings are of any direct consequence, they favor home-mortgage borrowers by putting downward pressure on mortgage rates. This increases the interest rates faced by other borrowers, compared with holding an equivalent amount of Treasurys. It is as if the Fed has provided off-budget funding for home-mortgage borrowers, financed by selling U.S. Treasury debt to the public.
Such interference in the allocation of credit is an inappropriate use of the central bank’s asset portfolio. It is not necessary for conducting monetary policy, and it involves distributional choices that should be made through the democratic process and carried out by fiscal authorities, not at the discretion of an independent central bank.
Some will say that central bank credit-market interventions reflect an age-old role as “lender of last resort.” But this expression historically referred to policies aimed at increasing the supply of paper notes when the demand for notes surged during episodes of financial turmoil. Today, fluctuations in the demand for central bank money can easily be accommodated through open-market purchases of Treasury securities. Expansive lending powers raise credit-allocation concerns similar to those raised by the purchase of private assets.
Moreover, Federal Reserve actions in the recent crisis bore little resemblance to the historical concept of a lender of last resort. While these actions were intended to preserve the stability of the financial system, they may have actually promoted greater fragility. Ambiguous boundaries around Fed credit-market intervention create expectations of intervention in future crises, dampening incentives for the private sector to monitor risk-taking and seek out stable funding arrangements.
Central bank operational independence is a unique institutional privilege. While such independence is vitally important to preserving monetary stability, it is likely to prove unstable—both politically and economically—without clear boundaries. Central bank actions that alter the allocation of credit blur those boundaries and endanger the stability the Fed was designed to ensure.

Tuesday, September 30, 2014

Labor Arbitrage in the 21st Century

DVD, a blogger, writes:
Yes, the US must go deeper and deeper into debt if it has to issue more and more $ as international reserve currency to the rest of the world that grows faster than itself, if for no other reason than because it is less advanced. This is clear for over 30 years already.
Yes, China – among other countries but on a different scale given it sheer size – has gamed the system in the 1990’s and 2000’s by joining the global trade system while undervaluing its currency relative to the $ and suppressing domestic consumption so as to accelerate its economic development at the expense of the US and of developed countries in general.
But if you are aiming to resolve the situation, it is critical to realize that China has done so under the intellectual authority of anglo-saxon theoricians and with the very interested complicity of Western multinational corporations and banks. US ideologues and big business interests have been China best allies in gaming the system.
You have reminded us that if China sells more goods to the US than it purchases from the US, it ends up with a credit on the US for the surplus. In other words, goods are exchanged not for other goods (via money as a medium) but for credit.
This is very directly in contradiction with the theory which has served and still serves today (you have of course used it in your article) as the justification for the push towards free trade globalisation since the 1970’s, namely David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage.
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage states that countries will mutually benefit if they exchange finished products for which they have a relative cost advantage, leading to a specialisation of said countries in the production of said finished products, leading to a rising standard of living in all participating countries. This conclusion is reached under the assumption that countries trade finished goods for finished goods, for instance Portugal sells wine to England in exchange for cloth. This goods for goods exchange means that, in Ricardo’s framework, trade balance remain balanced. Said differently, Ricardo’s theory is not supposed to be valid if a country exchange goods for IOUs issued by another country. Oops! In a monetary environment, the corresponding assumption would be that exchange rates are set at levels that, on average, makes the respective trade balance be at equilibrium. There is no doubt that this mutual benefit is the intention of the founding fathers of the GATT as it is explicitly and solemnly indicated in the preamble to the original 1947 agreement. However, to my knowledge, nowhere in the various GATT / WTO agreements that have been signed over recent decades to liberalise international trade is there any mention of the fact that exchange rates should be set at levels that make trade flows balanced across participating countries. The WTO has pushed free trade globalization without any consideration for exchange rates. As if international trade and exchange rates were two completely different things, while of course they are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. Re-oops!
Instead, Milton Friedman theory of floating exchange rates has been added to Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages as the second intellectual backbone of the push towards trade globalisation in the post Bretton Woods world unilaterally decided by the US in 1971.
Milton Friedman’s theory states that market forces will ensure that exchange rates adjust at levels which, on average, make trade balances balance. This conclusion is reached under the assumption that there is no official intervention in FX markets. Of course, this assumption has never been valid in the real world. In practise, surplus countries recycle their accumulated monetary reserves back into the deficit countries, thereby bidding up the currency of the deficit country relative to their own, thus completely negating the adjustment envisaged by Friedman. Re-re-oops!
So, in the current system, trades flows result in large and persistent imbalances and goods are not being exchange for other goods but increasingly for credit. Like global trade has been growing faster than GDP from the early 1980’s, so has global debt. If this continues long enough, of course debtor countries will eventually reach a point where they are no longer solvent and creditor countries will eventually pay the price by holding worthless bonds. The mutually beneficial outcome initially envisaged by the theory will end up being mutually detrimental in practise. Bravo!
In the meantime, rising debt is a blessing for banks which see the cake on which they charge interest and / or trading commissions grow, further compounded by countless derivatives and repackaging opportunities on these securities. Exchange rate volatility is also a blessing for banks as it means much more commissions on FX trades and related derivatives than in a world of fixed but adjustable exchange rates like pre-1971. Financial profits as % of GDP have increased dramatically since the early 1980’s.
There is more still. Ricardo’s theory also assumes that there is no relative technological change between countries engaged in trade. But, in the current system, US firms can set up in China via FDI with their own equipment, technology and range of intermediary products. Said differently, US firms can import US relative advantage (ie. its modern production technology) to China and combine it with China relative advantage (ie. its cheap labor). At the end, the technological transfer means that the initial relative advantage between countries is altered. China ends up with both efficient production methods imported from the US – which means that its initially lower productivity can quickly catch up – and cheap labor. The overall balance of relative advantages is firmly tilted into China’s favor. Under this condition, it is no surprise that trade becomes unbalanced and that China becomes net exporter to the US. To my knowledge, nowhere in the GATT / WTO agreements is there any restrictions on cross-border investments that alter the initial conditions of production, ie. the comparative advantages in Ricardo’s sense, between participating countries. Re-re-re-oops!
Developed countries multinational firms and their shareholders are happy as the product of this arbitrage (labor costs / productivity x exchange rate) goes straight to their profits. Like global trade has been rising faster than global GDP since the early 1980’s, so has global profits. Symmetrically, global wages have grown more slowly than GDP. Here is the source of the weak aggregate demand. Here is the source of deflationary forces. As discussed in “Economic Consequences of Income Inequality”, soaring global debt has been the price to pay for global demand to keep up with global production despite global labor share of production falling materially.
So, we see that the intellectual foundation and justification for the current international trade and monetary system in place since the 1970’s are very weak and essentially non-existent. Certainly, things have not been working according to these David Ricardo and Milton Friedman theories. They have been contradicted by the facts, either because they are wrong or because they are only correct under certain assumptions that are not met in the real world. Remember, when the theories and the facts are not in accordance, it is always the facts that are correct.
Global trade has not been mutually beneficial. Under-employment (official unemployment + part time for economic reasons + dropping out of labor force for reasons unrelated to demographics + disability) has skyrocketed in developed countries, in parallel with debt. Floating exchange rates, while they have certainly been very volatile, have not pushed trade balances any closer to equilibrium, quite the opposite.
All of this is perfectly understood by all the managers of multinational companies that evaluate precisely all these factors when they decide to set up, acquire a local company or expand in developing countries and assess the “value creation” potential of such a move. Of course, in such a system, the value creation accruing to the shareholders of the multinational companies is compensated by the value destruction for developed countries via the mutualisation and socialisation of jobs losses, salary losses and bad debts losses. That’s why profit share of GDP and total-debt-to-GDP have been rising in tandem on a global basis since the early 1980’s. The system results in private profits being funded by socialized losses. Income and wealth inequality within countries have been soaring since the early 1980’s even as the average gap between countries has been narrowing. Not quite the definition of mutually beneficial.
While all of this is very well understood by managers of large companies (who are in it big time “gaming the system” with China) it remains poorly understood or at least not publicly recognized by many economists (yourself are part of a small minority) and virtually all policymakers that continue to use Ricardo’s comparative advantage and Friedman’s freely floating exchange rate theories as justification for a system that is dangerously unbalanced and leveraged and behaving in complete contradiction to the predicted results. Whether these ideologues and policymakers are completely blind to facts, or whether they are in the pocket of big business, or both, remains a matter of speculation for the time being.
Maurice Allais was already using the prestige of his 1988 Nobel Prize to explain in the early 1990’s what you are now explaining. He was not only ignored but ridiculed despite his explanations making complete sense and never being seriously challenged. In that case, the propagandists know what to do: attack the person if you can’t attack his ideas. By the time what he had long predicted finally occurred in 2008, he was 97 years old and was no longer intervening in the public debate. He became bitter and disillusioned and concluded that “it’s impossible to make the blind see and the deaf hear”. Now, it’ your turn to try. While 2008 might have shaken a few beliefs and might have raised the critical spirit of many ordinary people towards the official party line, you can’t underestimate the interests that you are taking on. You are asking big corporations and big banks to lower their share of profit. Of course, it is in their interest to have a gradual relative drop over time rather than a complete, sudden and absolute collapse as in the early 1930’s but don’t believe that they are so reasonable.
In any case, thank you for yet another stimulating article. Beyond the very clear explanation of the mechanisms at play, what is missing in my opinion is still the same: what is the solution? I mean other than letting the system go to the wall. There is, i think, a way to keep international trade open while preventing the development of debt-funded imbalances and while closing these labor arbitrage opportunities that are eroding aggregate demand and feeding the debt snowball. It seems logical to me that this is where your so far largely descriptive work leads to.
In any case, it is very clear from the on-going response to 2008-2009 that we shouldn’t count on G20 officials to change the system. They are the system. Developing countries officials are happy as they provide jobs for their people. Developed countries officials are happy as they provide profits to their corporate and financial benefactors (who cares if they effectively let down large parts of their population as long as they can plausibly deny it and issue empty words to the contrary?). The world continues to releverage at an even steeper pace than pre-2007 (thanks to China in no small measure), which is precisely the point of the “credit easing” policy applied everywhere. Speculative bubbles are bigger and more widespread than in 2000 ad 2007. Under-employment remains unbearably high many developed countries. Profit share continues to go up. Labor share continues to go down. Income and wealth inequalities are stretched beyond merit. Social tensions are rising. Currency wars are raging. One would be forgiven to think the G20 has been actively preparing the next crisis.
Any chance of resolving this peacefully now rest on people like you with a clear grasp of what’s going on, an understanding of the lessons of history, a passion and a talent for explaining it and the great ability to get an audience.